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Abstract—The integration of renewable generation poses oper-
ational and economic challenges for the electricity grid. For
the core problem of power balance, the legacy paradigm of
tailoring supply to follow random demand may be inappropriate
under deep penetration of uncertain and intermittent renewable
generation. In this situation, there is an emerging consensus
that the alternative approach of controlling demand to follow
random supply offers compelling economic benefits in terms of
reduced regulation costs. This approach exploits the flexibility
of demand side resources and requires sensing, actuation, and
communication infrastructure; distributed control algorithms;
and viable schemes to compensate participating loads. This paper
considers rate-constrained energy services which are a specific
paradigm for flexible demand. These services are characterized
by a specified delivery window, the total amount of energy that
must be supplied over this window, and the maximum rate at
which this energy may be delivered. We consider a forward
market where rate-constrained energy services are traded. We
explore allocation policies and market decisions of a supplier in
this market. The supplier owns a generation mix that includes
some uncertain renewable generation and may also purchase
energy in day-ahead and real-time markets to meet customer
demand. The supplier must optimally select the portfolio of rate-
constrained services to sell, the amount of day-ahead energy
to buy, and the policies for making real-time energy purchases
and allocations to customers to maximize its expected profit. We
offer solutions to the supplier’s decision and control problems to
economically provide rate constrained energy services.
I. INTRODUCTION
The worldwide interest in renewable energy is driven by
pressing environmental problems, energy supply security and
nuclear power safety concerns. The energy production from
these renewable sources is variable: uncontrollable, inter-
mittent, uncertain. Variability is the core challenge to deep
renewable integration.
A central problem in this context is that of economically
balancing demand and supply of electricity in the presence
of large amounts of variable generation. The legacy supply
side approach is to absorb the variability in operating reserves.
Here, renewables are treated as negative demand, so the
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variability appears as uncertainty in net load. This variability
is handled by scheduling fast-acting reserve generation. This
strategy of tailoring supply to meet demand works at today’s
modest penetration levels. But it will not scale. Recent studies
in California [1] project that the load-following capacity
requirements will need to increase from 2.3 GW to 4.4
GW. These large increases in reserves will significantly raise
electricity cost, and diminish the net carbon benefit from
renewables ( [2], [3]).
There is an emerging consensus that demand side resources
must play a key role in supplying zero-emissions regulation
services that are necessary for deep renewable integration
(e.g., [4]–[8]). These include thermostatically controlled loads
(TCLs), electric vehicles (EVs), and smart appliances. Some
of these loads are deferrable: they can be shifted over time.
For example, charging of electrical vehicles (EVs) may be
postponed to some degree. Other loads such as HVAC units
can be modulated within limits. The core idea of demand
side approaches to renewable integration is to exploit load
flexibility to track variability in supply, i.e., to tailor demand
to match supply. For this an aggregator offers a control and
business interface between the flexible loads and the system
operator (SO).
The demand side approach has led to two streams of work:
(a) indirect load control (ILC) where flexible loads respond,
in real-time, to price proxy signals, and (b) direct load control
(DLC) where flexible loads cede physical control of devices
to operators (cluster managers) who determine appropriate
actions. The advantage of DLC is that with greater control
authority the cluster manager can more reliably control the
aggregate load. However, DLC requires a more extensive con-
trol and communication infrastructure and the manager must
provide economic incentives to recruit a sufficient consumer
base. The advantage of ILC is that the consumer retains
authority over her electricity consumption.
Current research in direct load control focuses on developing
and analyzing algorithms for coordinating resources [5], [6],
[9]–[15]. For example, [13] develops a distributed scheduling
protocol for electric vehicle charging; [6] uses approximate dy-
namic programming to couple wind generation with deferrable
loads; and [5], [14], [15] suggest the use of receding horizon
control approaches for resource scheduling.
Recent studies in indirect load control have developed real-
time pricing algorithms [16], [17] and quantified operational
benefits [18]. There has also been research focused on eco-
nomic efficiency in [19], [20], feedback stability of price
2signals in [21], volatility of real-time markets in [22] as
well as the practical issues associated with implementing ILC
programs presented in [23].
Both ILC and DLC require appropriate economic incentives
for the consumers. In ILC, the real-time price signals provides
the required incentives. However, the quantification of those
prices, the feasibility of consumer response and the impact on
the system and market operations in terms of price volatility
and instabilities is a matter of concern, as recent literature
suggests ( [21]–[23]).
DLC also requires the creation of economic signals, but unlike
real-time pricing schemes DLC can use forward markets.
For DLC to be effective, it is necessary to offer consumers
who present greater demand flexibility a larger discount.
The discounted pricing can be arranged through flexibility-
differentiated electricity markets. Here, electricity is regarded
as a set of differentiated services as opposed to a homogeneous
commodity. Consumers can purchase an appropriate bundle
of services that best meets their electricity needs. From the
producer’s perspective, providing differentiated services may
better accommodate supply variability. There is a growing
body of work [24]–[27] on differentiated electricity services.
An early exposition of differentiated energy services is of-
fered in [28]. There are other approaches to such services
that naturally serve to integrate variable generation sources.
Reliability differentiated energy services where consumers
accept contracts for p MW of power with probability ρ are
developed in [24]. More recently, the works of [27], [29]
consider deadline differentiated contracts where consumers
receive price discounts for offering larger windows for the
delivery of E MWh of energy.
This paper follows the direct load control paradigm. We
consider a supplier proving rate-constrained energy series to
its customers. These services are characterized by the total
amount of energy that must be delivered over a specified time
period and the maximum rate at which this energy may be
delivered. Examples of loads that can use these services in-
clude electric vehicles, pumping systems and smart appliances.
The supplier can use its uncertain renewable generation as
well as energy purchased in day-ahead and real-time energy
markets to serve its customers. The supplier has to optimize
the portfolio of rate-constrained services to sell, the amount
of day-ahead energy to buy and the policies for making real-
time energy purchases and allocations to customers in order
to maximize its expected profit. We provide solutions to the
supplier’s decision and control problems in this paper.
This paper is organized as follows. We describe the supplier’s
operation and formulate its optimization problem in Section II.
For a fixed choice of forward market decisions, we find opti-
mal real-time energy purchase and energy allocation policies
for the supplier in Section III. Using these optimal policies,
we provide a solution strategy for the supplier’s optimization
problem in Section IV. We draw conclusions in Section V.
Notation
Capital letters are random variables/random vectors. Small
letters are realizations. Bold letters denote vectors. For a
vector a = (a1, a2, . . . , aT ), a↓ = (a
↓
1, . . . , a
↓
T ) denotes
the non-increasing rearrangement of a, so, a↓t ≥ a
↓
t+1 for
t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1. For an assertion A, 1A denotes 1 if A is
true and 0 if A is false. (x)+ denotes max(x, 0), ⌊x⌋ denotes
the largest integer less than or equal to x, and ⌈x⌉ denotes the
smallest integer greater than or equal to x.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a supplier providing rate-constrained energy
services to consumers. The services are to be delivered over
a time interval of T units divided into discrete slots of unit
duration. A rate-constrained energy service is characterized by
the pair (E,m), where E represents the total amount of energy
and m represents the maximum energy that can be delivered
per time slot. m is referred to as the rate-constraint of the
service. The pair (E,m) is restricted to be within a bounded
set in the non-negative quadrant of R2. Services must also
satisfy a basic feasibility condition: E ≤ mT .
A (E,m) service can be provided by any energy allocation
u1, u2, . . . , uT that satisfies
T∑
t=1
ut = E, 0 ≤ ut ≤ m.
The supplier sells the services to consumers in a forward
market. The market specifies a price π(E,m) for the service
(E,m). The market prices are known a priori and the supplier
and consumers act as price-takers in the forward market for
services.
A. Energy sources
The supplier can use three types of energy sources to provide
the services:
1) Renewable energy: The supplier has access to an uncer-
tain supply of renewable energy available at zero marginal
cost. The renewable supply over the delivery period is
denoted by the random vector R = (R1, R2, . . . , RT ),
where Rt is the energy available in the t-th time slot. Its
realizations are denoted by r = (r1, r2, . . . , rT ).
2) Day-ahead energy: The supplier can purchase energy in
a day-ahead market at a price cda. The energy purchased
in the day-ahead market is used over the delivery period.
The day-ahead energy is denoted by y = (y1, . . . , yT ),
where yt is energy available in the t-th time slot.
3) Real-time energy: In addition to the day-ahead purchases,
the supplier can purchase energy in a real-time market at
the beginning of each of the T time slots. The real-time
energy price is crt.
3B. Supplier’s operation
Suppose the supplier sells n services in the forward market for
services. We will denote by C the set of services sold. Thus,
C = {(E1,m1), (E2,m2), . . . , (En,mn)}
The ith service is delivered to the ith consumer. The supplier
earns a total revenue of
n∑
i=1
π(Ei,mi).
At the time of making its day-ahead purchase, the supplier
has a forecast model for its renewable supply specified as a
probability distribution for the random vector R. Suppose the
supplier purchases the supply vector y in the day-ahead energy
market. Then, its day-ahead cost is
cda
T∑
t=1
yt.
The real-time operation of the supplier is as follows:
(i) At the beginning of the t-th time slot, the supplier
observes the renewable supply, Rt, for that slot.
(ii) It decides the amount of real-time energy to purchase in
that slot. This amount is denoted by At and is chosen
according to a real-time purchase policy g = (g1, . . . gT )
so that
At = gt(C,y, R1, R2, . . . , Rt).
(iii) The total energy available in the t-th slot is yt+Rt+At.
The supplier allocates this energy among its consumers.
The energy allocated to the the ith consumer is denoted
by U it . The allocation amounts are chosen according to
an allocation policy hi = (hi1, . . . , hiT ), i = 1, . . . , n so
that
U it = h
i
t(C,y, R1, R2, . . . , Rt),
with the constraint that total allocated energy
∑
i U
i
t in
the tth slot cannot exceed the total available energy in
that slot, that is,
n∑
i=1
U it ≤ yt +Rt +At.
The supplier is required to fully satisfy its consumers. That
is, the ith consumer who purchased the service (Ei,mi) must
receive an allocation that satisfies∑
t
U it = E
i, 0 ≤ U it ≤ m
i.
C. Discretization of services
The pair (E,m) characterizing a service can take any non-
negative value from a bounded set in R2. This leads to
a continuum of possible services in the market. For both
mathematical and modeling reasons, it will be convenient to
assume that energy is sold and allocated in discrete multiples
of some basic unit (say, kW×duration of one time slot). This
implies that E, m as well as the allocations U it take discrete
(non-negative integer) values. In particular, the allocation U it
in the supplier’s optimization problem is constrained to take
values in the finite set {0, 1, . . . ,mi}.
D. Optimization problem
The supplier has to select the set C of services to be sold
(both the cardinality n and the types of services) in the forward
market, the day-ahead energy to purchase, a real-time purchase
policy g and allocation policies hi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n in order to
maximize its expected profit
J :=
n∑
i=1
π(Ei,mi)− cda
T∑
t=1
yt − c
rt
E
[
T∑
t=1
At
]
subject to
T∑
t=1
U it = E
i, U it ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m
i}, i = 1, . . . , n,
n∑
i=1
U it ≤ yt +Rt +At,
At = gt(C,y, R1, R2, . . . , Rt),
and
U it = h
i
t(C,y, R1, R2, . . . , Rt), i = 1, . . . , n.
Remark 1. Note that cda, crt are the day-ahead and real-
time prices, respectively, for 1 (discrete) unit of energy. These
prices would be scaled appropriately if the discretization unit
is changed.
III. OPTIMAL POLICIES FOR FIXED C,y
For a fixed choice of C,y, the maximum achievable profit can
be written as
J(C,y) =
n∑
i=1
π(Ei,mi)− cda
T∑
t=1
yt − V (C,y), (1)
where
V (C,y) = min
g,h
crtE
[
T∑
t=1
At
]
subject to∑
t
U it = E
i, U it ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m
i}, i = 1, . . . , n,
n∑
i=1
U it ≤ yt +Rt +At,
At = gt(C,y, R1, R2, . . . , Rt),
U it = h
i
t(C,y, R1, R2, . . . , Rt), i = 1, . . . , n.
(2)
Our main goal in this section is to characterize the function
V (C,y). Our approach will be to first find a lower bound on
V (C,y) under a information relaxation assumption where a
oracle has revealed a priori the realization of renewable gen-
eration, and then constructing real-time policies that achieve
this lower bound. We will proceed in the following steps:
41. Suppose it was known a priori (that is, before the start
of real-time operation) that the total available supply is
going to be p = (p1, p2, . . . , pT ). We will find conditions
under which this supply by itself is adequate for providing
all the services in C.
2. Suppose the realization of the renewable supply was
known a priori to be r = (r1, r2, . . . , rT ). Then, without
any real-time purchases, the available supply would be
p = y + r. Using the conditions obtained in Step 1, we
can determine if the supply y+r is adequate for providing
all the services in C. If the supply is not adequate, we will
find the minimum amount of additional energy required
to achieve adequacy. Let this amount be denoted by
L(C,y, r).
3. Recall that under a real-time purchase policy, the pur-
chase decision at time slot t is made without knowing the
realization of future renewable generation. We will argue
that in order to satisfy all the problem constraints of (2),
a real-time purchase policy must satisfy the inequality
T∑
t=1
gt(C,y, r1, r2, . . . , rt) ≥ L(C,y, r), (3)
for each realization r = (r1, . . . , rT ), where L(C,y, r)
is the lower bound obtained in Step 2. In other words,
for each realization r, a real-time purchase policy g must
purchase at least L(C,y, r) amount of energy in order to
provide all the services.
4. Finally, we will construct a real-time purchase policy g∗
that achieves the lower bound in (3). This would imply
that the expected cost of real-time purchases under this
policy is equal to V (C,y).
A. Step 1: Characterizing Adequacy
Consider a given set of services C. Suppose that the available
supply is known a priori to be p. We want to determine if p
is adequate for the set of services C without any additional
energy purchases. We can formally define the adequacy of p
for C as follows.
Definition 1. The available supply p is adequate for the
services in C if there exist allocations uit, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
t = 1, 2, . . . , T that satisfy∑
t
uit = E
i, uit ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m
i}, i = 1, . . . , n,
n∑
i=1
uit ≤ pt.
To answer the question of adequacy, we will take a closer look
at the allocations needed for each individual service. Consider
the service (E,m). Since we assumed discrete values for E
and m, we can find non-negative integers k, ℓ with ℓ < m
such that
E = km+ ℓ.
We now define a decomposition of the service (E,m) into m
separate services all of which have a rate constraint equal to
1.
Definition 2. For a service (E,m) with E = km+ ℓ, ℓ < m,
we define a unit-rate decomposition of the service, denoted by
D(E,m), as the following collection of services
D(E,m) := {(Ej , 1)|j = 1, 2, . . . ,m}, (4)
where
Ej =
{
k + 1 for j ≤ ℓ,
k for j > ℓ . (5)
The following lemma provides an equivalence between the
service (E,m) and its unit rate decomposition D(E,m) from
an allocation perspective.
Lemma 1. For a service (E,m) with E = km + ℓ, ℓ < m,
an allocation ut, t = 1, . . . , T satisfies
T∑
t=1
ut = E, ut ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}
if and only if ut =
∑m
j=1 ν
j
t , t = 1, . . . , T such that
T∑
t=1
νjt = k + 1, ν
j
t ∈ {0, 1} for j = 1, 2, . . . , ℓi,
T∑
t=1
νjt = k, ν
j
t ∈ {0, 1} for j = ℓi + 1, . . . ,mi (6)
Proof: See Appendix B.
We define a unit-rate decomposition for a collection of services
C as
D(C) :=
n⋃
i=1
D(Ei,mi). (7)
The following result is a direct consequence of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. The available supply p is adequate for set of
services C if and only if it is adequate for D(C).
The utility of Lemma 2 comes from the fact that all services
in D(C) have the same rate constraint, m = 1. The services
in D(C) differ only in the amount of total energy requested.
Therefore, we can write this collection of services as
D(C) = {(Ej , 1)|j = 1, 2, . . . , N}.
We will focus on the adequacy characterization for D(C). We
first define a stronger version of adequacy that removes the
possibility of excess energy.
Definition 3. The available supply p is exactly adequate
for the services in D(C) if there exist allocations νjt , i =
1, 2, . . . , N , t = 1, 2, . . . , T that satisfy
T∑
t=1
νjt = E
j , νjt ∈ {0, 1}, j = 1, . . . , N,
N∑
j=1
νjt = pt.
5The binary allocation decisions νjt can now be interpreted
as on-off decisions for supplying energy to the jth service
in D(C) at time t. The constraint
∑T
t=1 ν
j
t = E
j can then
be viewed as specifying the total duration for which energy
supply for the jth service is turned on. We will therefore refer
to Ej as the duration requested by the jth service in D(C).
We now define a demand-duration vector for a collection of
unit-rate services.
Definition 4. For the collection of services D(C), let dt be
number of services with requested duration Ej ≥ t, that is,
dt :=
N∑
j=1
1{Ej≥t}.
The vector d = (d1, d2, . . . , dT ) is called the demand-duration
vector for D(C).
We will characterize adequacy in terms of a majorization
relation between the supply p and the demand-duration vector
d. We need the following definitions.
Definition 5 (Majorization). Let a = (a1, · · · , aT ) and b =
(b1, · · · , bT ) be two non-negative vectors. Denote by a↓,b↓
the non-increasing rearrangements of a and b respectively. We
say that a majorizes b, written a ≺ b, if
(i) ∑Ts=t a↓s ≤∑Ts=t b↓s , for t = 1, 2, . . . , T , and
(ii) ∑Ts=1 a↓s =∑Ts=1 b↓s .
If only the first condition holds, we say that a weakly
majorizes b, written a ≺w b.
Remark 2. The inequalities in our definition of majorization
are reversed from standard use in majorization theory. This
departure from convention allows us to write our adequacy
conditions as d ≺ p and d ≺w p which resemble the
more familiar adequacy condition of demand being “less than”
supply .
Theorem 1 (ADEQUACY). Let d be the demand-duration
vector for the collection of services D(C). Then,
(a) The supply p is exactly adequate for D(C) if and only
if d ≺ p.
(b) The supply p is adequate for D(C) if and only if d ≺w
p.
Proof: Proof See Appendix C.
Remark 3. It follows from the definition of d that dt ≥ dt+1.
Thus, d = d↓.
Given an adequate supply p for D(C), the following result
provides an algorithm that finds the allocations νjt .
Theorem 2. Suppose p is adequate for
D(C) = {(Ej , 1)|j = 1, 2, . . . , N}.
Construct νjt sequentially as follows:
(i) At time t = 1, xj1 := T − Ej . Let π be a permutation
of {1, . . .N} such that π(j) < π(k) implies xj1 ≤ xk1 .
Set
νj1 =
{
1 π(j) ≤ p1 and Ej > 0,
0 otherwise (8)
(ii) At time t, xjt := T − t + 1 −
(
Ej −
∑t−1
s=1 ν
j
s
)
. Let
π be a permutation of {1, . . .N} such that π(j) < π(k)
implies xjt ≤ xkt . Set
νjt =
{
1 π(j) ≤ pt and (Ej −
∑t−1
s=1 ν
j
s ) > 0,
0 otherwise (9)
Then,
T∑
t=1
νjt = E
j ,
N∑
j=1
νjt ≤ pt.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Remark 4. The quantity xjt can be interpreted as the laxity
associated with service j at time t. The allocation algorithm
of Theorem 2 is therefore a least laxity first algorithm [8].
Note that even though we assumed that the supply p is known
in advance, the allocation algorithm described in Theorem 2
is actually causal, that is, the allocations νjt at time t do not
depend on future supply pt+1, . . . , pT . This causality will be
crucial for constructing the allocation policies hi described in
Section II.
B. Step 2: Energy gap for adequacy
Consider a given set of services C, day ahead energy supply
y. Assume that the renewable supply is known a priori to be
r and let p = y+ r. The supply vector p may or may not be
adequate for D(C).
Define
L(C,y, r) :=
[
max
1≤t≤T
T∑
s=t
(ds − p
↓
s)
]+
(10)
where p = y + r and d is the demand duration vector
associated with D(C). The following lemma establishes that
L(C,y, r) is a lower bound on the amount of additional energy
that must be added to p to achieve adequacy.
Lemma 3. Let q ≥ p (that is, qt ≥ pt for all t) be any vector
that satisfies d ≺w q. Then,
T∑
t=1
(qt − pt) ≥
[
max
1≤r≤T
T∑
s=r
(ds − p
↓
s)
]+
(11)
Proof: See Appendix E.
Remark 5. The vector p↓ is referred to as the supply-duration
vector.
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We now return to the problem of finding real-time purchase
and allocation policies g, hi, i = 1, . . . , n. Consider any choice
of policies that satisfy the constraints in (2) for all realizations
of renewable supply. Consider a realization r of the renewable
supply. Then, the total supply under the real-time purchase
policy g is
qt = yt + rt + gt(C,y, r1, . . . , rt), t = 1, . . . , T. (12)
Let uit be the realizations of the allocation decisions under
the allocation policy hi, i = 1, . . . , n. Since we know that the
policies g, hi, i = 1, . . . , n satisfy the constraints (2) for all
realizations of renewable supply, it follows that∑
t
uit = E
i, uit ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m
i}, i = 1, . . . , n,
n∑
i=1
uit ≤ qt = yt + rt + gt(C,y, r1, . . . , rt),
(13)
Thus the supply q = (q1, . . . , qT ) is adequate for C. By
Lemma 3, it follows that
T∑
t=1
(qt − pt) ≥
[
max
1≤r≤T
T∑
s=r
(ds − p
↓
s)
]+
, (14)
where pt = yt + rt. (14) implies that
T∑
t=1
gt(C,y, r1, . . . , rt) ≥
[
max
1≤r≤T
T∑
s=r
(ds − p
↓
s)
]+
. (15)
In other words, for each realization r, the function L(C,y, r)
is a lower bound on the total amount of real-time energy
purchased.
D. Step 4: Construction of optimal policies
Consider the collection of services C with the associated
decompositionD(C) and the demand-duration vector d and the
day-ahead energy y. Consider the following real-time purchase
policy, g∗:
(i) At t = 1, for a realization r1 of R1, the real-time
purchase is a1 = g∗1(C,y, r1) := (dT − y1 − r1)+.
(ii) At time t, for a realization r1, . . . , rt of renewable
supply and the realization a1, . . . , at−1 of past real-time
purchases, at = g∗t (C,y, r1, . . . , rt) is defined as the
solution of the following minimization problem
min
at≥0
at
s.t. (y1 + r1 + a1, . . . , yt−1 + rt−1 + at−1, yt + rt + at)
≻w (dT−t+1, dT−t+2, . . . , dT ), (16)
where, for s < t, as = g∗s (C,y, r1, . . . , rs).
Note that the majorization relation in (16) is between two t−
dimensional vectors.
Theorem 3. 1) For every realization r of renewable supply,
the policy g∗ generates a total supply vector q =
(q1, . . . , qT ), with qt = yt+rt+g∗t (C,y, r1, . . . , rt), that
satisfies
d ≺w q
2) Consider the virtual set of services D(C). The allocation
decisions νjt for the virtual services in D(C) are obtained
using the (causal) allocation algorithm of Theorem 2 by
replacing pt with qt. For a service (Ei,mi) in the set of
actual services C,
D(Ei,mi) = {(Ej1 , 1), . . . , (Ejmi , 1)} ⊂ D(C).
The actual allocation decision for this service is uit =∑mi
k=1 ν
jk
t . The allocations satisfy the constraints (2) for
each realization of r.
3) For each r, the total amount of real-time purchases under
g∗ is equal to the lower bound L(C,y, r). Thus, g∗ is
optimal and
V (C,y) = ER[L(C,y,R)]
= ER
[
max
1≤t≤T
T∑
s=t
(ds − P
↓
s )
]+
, (17)
where P = y +R.
Proof: See Appendix F.
Remark 6. The above results are derived under the as-
sumption that real-time energy price is constant over the
time horizon under consideration. It remains to be seen if
analogous results can be obtained with time-varying prices.
IV. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
We now return to the expected profit maximization problem
formulated in Section II-D. Using (1) from Section III, the
expected profit maximization problem can be written as
J∗ = max
C,y
J(C,y)
= max
C,y
[
n∑
i=1
π(Ei,mi)− cda
T∑
t=1
yt − V (C,y)
]
, (18)
which by Theorem 3 can be written as
max
C,y
[
n∑
i=1
π(Ei,mi)− cda
T∑
t=1
yt
− ER
[
max
1≤t≤T
T∑
s=t
(ds − P
↓
s )
]+ ]
, (19)
where P = y + R, and d is the demand-duration vector
associated with D(C).
Market Price Assumption: Consider a service (E,m) with its
unit rate decomposition being
D(E,m) = {(E1, 1), . . . , (Em, 1)}.
7We will assume that the market price for the service (E,m)
is equal to the sum of prices for services in its unit rate
decomposition. That is,
π(E,m) =
m∑
j=1
π(Ej , 1) (20)
This assumption can be justified by the following reason-
ing: Suppose π(E,m) >
∑m
j=1 π(E
j , 1). Then, because of
Lemma 1, a consumer who wants to purchase the service
(E,m) can get the same allocation at a cheaper price by
purchasing the collection of services D(E,m) instead. Thus,
effectively, an (E,m) service can be purchased at the price
of
∑m
j=1 π(E
j , 1) in this market. Conversely, suppose that
π(E,m) <
∑m
j=1 π(E
j , 1). Because of the argument of
Section III, V (C,y) = V (D(C),y). Therefore, if π(E,m) <∑m
j=1 π(E
j , 1), then it follows that J(C,y) < J(D(C),y).
Thus, the supplier would only sell unit rate services and a
consumer requiring (E,m) service would have to purchase
the collection D(E,m) instead. The effective market price for
(E,m) service would once again be
∑m
j=1 π(E
j , 1)1.
Because of (20), J(C,y) = J(D(C),y). Therefore, we will
consider only collections of unit rate services for profit max-
imization. The optimal collection of unit rate services can
then be bundled and sold in different combinations without
changing the profit. The revenue from selling a collection of
unit rate services {(Ej , 1)|j = 1, . . . , N} is
N∑
j=1
π(Ej , 1) =
T∑
t=1
π(t, 1)

 N∑
j=1
1{Ej=t}


=
T∑
t=1
π(t, 1) (dt − dt+1) , (21)
where we used the definition of demand duration vector d
(Definition 4) with dT+1 := 0. Using (21), the maximization
problem of (19) can be written as
max
d,y
J(d,y)
:= max
d,y
[
T∑
t=1
π(t, 1) (dt − dt+1)− c
da
T∑
t=1
yt
− ER
[
max
1≤t≤T
T∑
s=t
(ds − P
↓
s )
]+ ]
, (22)
where P = y + R. The optimization problem in (22) is an
integer programming problem since d,y are constrained to be
non-negative integers (recall that the services and allocations
were assumed to be discrete-valued). Approximate solutions
to this integer program can be obtained by first solving the
optimization problem without integer constraints and then
rounding up/down the non-integer solution. The following
result establishes the efficiency and accuracy of this approach.
Theorem 4. 1. The optimization problem of (22) without
the integer constraints is a convex optimization problem. We
denote its solution by (dc,yc).
1We are assuming that the bundling of services incurs no additional costs.
2. Construct an integer solution (da,ya) from (dc,yc) as
follows:
(dat − d
a
t+1) = ⌊d
c
t − d
c
t+1⌋ (23)
yat = ⌈y
c
t⌉ (24)
Let d∗,y∗ be the maximizing vectors for the integer program
of (22). Then,
J(d∗,y∗)− J(da,ya) ≤ cdaT +
T∑
t=1
π(t, 1). (25)
Proof: See Appendix G.
Remark 7. Note that the price of unit rate services and the
day-ahead energy price per unit will be lower if the discretiza-
tion unit for energy is smaller. Thus, the optimality gap in (25)
can be reduced by adopting a finer discretization of energy. In
[30], we consider a situation where the discretization is taken
to the limit and power levels can take real-number values.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Flexible loads are expected to play a central role in supporting
deep renewable integration. They enable demand shaping to
balance supply variability, and thus offer an effective alter-
native to conventional generation reserves. In this paper, we
studied a stylized model of flexible loads that require rate-
constrained energy services. Such a service is characterized
by the total amount of energy that must be delivered over
a specified time period and the maximum rate at which this
energy may be delivered. We addressed the problem of finding
optimal market decisions and allocation policies for a supplier
that can sell rate-constrained energy services in a forward
market and can use its uncertain renewable generation as
well as energy purchased in day-ahead and real-time energy
markets to serve its customers.
The theoretical analysis of this work can facilitate further
studies required for exploiting load flexibility. For example,
the results of this paper can be used to evaluate the value of
flexibility in reducing supplier’s cost under different forecast
models of renewable generation. Further, since supply ade-
quacy is not assessed at each time instant, forecasting the
exact profile of renewable generation may not be necessary.
Instead, the results of this paper suggest that for providing rate-
constrained energy services, the key metric to be estimated is
the supply-duration vector of the renewable generation. Other
directions for future work include investigation of competitive
equilibria in the forward market for energy services and
comparisons with other market structures such as spot markets.
APPENDIX A
PRELIMINARY MAJORIZATION BASED RESULTS
Let a = (a1, a2, . . . , aT ) and b = (b1, b2, . . . , bT ) be two
non-negative vectors arranged in non-increasing order (that is,
at ≥ at+1, and bt ≥ bt+1). Then a ≺ b if
8(i) ∑Ts=t as ≤∑Ts=t bs, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T , and
(ii) ∑Ts=1 as =∑Ts=1 bs.
The first condition above is equivalent to the following
condition: Let c be any rearrangement of b; then, for any
S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , T }, there exists S′ ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , T } of the
same cardinality as S such that
∑
s∈S′ as ≤
∑
s∈S cs.
Definition 6. We define a 1 unit Robin Hood (RH) transfer
on a as an operation that:
(i) Selects indices t, s such that at > as,
(ii) Replaces at by at − 1 and as by as + 1.
(iii) Rearranges the resulting vector in a non-increasing
order.
Lemma 4. Let a˜ be a vector obtained from a after a 1 unit
RH transfer. Then, a ≺ a˜.
Proof: Note that a˜ is a rearrangement of the vector aˆ =
(a1, a2, . . . , at− 1, . . . , as+1, . . . , aT ). In order to prove the
lemma, it suffices to show that for any set S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , T },
there exists S′ ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , T } of the same cardinality as S
such that
∑
r∈S′ ar ≤
∑
r∈S aˆr.
For any subset S of {1, 2, . . . , T },
(i) if t ∈ S, s ∈ S (or if t /∈ S, s /∈ S), then ∑r∈S aˆr =∑
r∈S ar. In this case, S′ = S satisfies our requirement.
(ii) if t /∈ S, s ∈ S, then ∑r∈S aˆr =∑r∈S ar+1. In this
case, S′ = S satisfies our requirement.
(iii) if t ∈ S, s /∈ S, then ∑r∈S aˆr = at − 1 +∑
r∈S\{t} aˆr ≥ as +
∑
r∈S\{t} aˆr = as +
∑
r∈S\{t} ar.
In this case, S′ = S \ {t}∪{s} satisfies our requirement.
Lemma 5. Suppose a ≺ b 2. If for any t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T , the
following conditions hold:
(i) aj = bj for all j < t,
(ii) at − aT ≤ 1.
Then, (a) at = bt, and (b) a = b.
Proof: a ≺ b and aj = bj for all j < t imply that
T∑
s=t+1
as ≤
T∑
s=t+1
bs,
T∑
s=t
as =
T∑
s=t
bs. (26)
Therefore,
at =
T∑
s=t
as −
T∑
s=t+1
as
≥
T∑
s=t
bs −
T∑
s=t+1
bs = bt. (27)
2Recall that the vectors are arranged in non-increasing order.
If at > bt, then
T∑
s=t
bs ≤ (T − t+ 1)bt ≤ (T − t+ 1)(at − 1).
On the other hand, since aT ≥ at − 1,
T∑
s=t
as > at − 1 +
T∑
s=t+1
as ≥ (T − t+ 1)(at − 1).
This implies that
∑T
s=t as 6=
∑T
s=t bs, which contradicts (26).
Thus, bt must be equal to at. Reapplying the first part of
the lemma for t + 1, then gives at+1 = bt+1. Proceeding
sequentially till T proves the second part of the lemma.
Lemma 6. Let a ≺ b and a 6= b. Then, there exists a 1
unit RH operation on a that gives a vector a˜ 6= a satisfying
a ≺ a˜ ≺ b.
Proof: a ≺ b implies that for all t,
t∑
s=1
bs =
T∑
s=1
bs −
T∑
r=t+1
br
≤
T∑
s=1
as −
T∑
r=t+1
ar =
t∑
s=1
as (28)
Let t be the smallest index such that at 6= bt. Then, bt < at
since
∑t
i=1 bi ≤
∑t
i=1 ai and the two vectors have the same
first t− 1 elements. Let s > t be the smallest index such that
at − as > 1. Such s must exist, otherwise Lemma 5 would
imply that a = b. Consider a 1 unit RH transfer from t to s.
Let a˜ be the resulting vector. Then, by Lemma 4, a ≺ a˜.
Also, if k is the number of elements of a with value equal to
at, then the number of elements of a˜ with value equal to at
is k − 1. Therefore, a˜ 6= a.
Further, it is clear that a and a˜ have the same first t − 1
elements (since the RH operation depleted 1 unit from at and
added it to as < at − 1, the non-increasing rearrangement
would not change the t − 1 highest elements.) Similarly, a
and a˜ have the same elements from index s to T . Further,
from the definition of s, aj ≥ at − 1 for t ≤ j < s.
Since, a˜t, a˜t+1 . . . , a˜s−1, must be a rearrangement of at −
1, at+1 . . . , as−1, it follows that a˜j ≥ at − 1 for t ≤ j < s.
We now prove that a˜ ≺ b. Clearly,
T∑
s=1
a˜s =
T∑
s=1
as =
T∑
s=1
bs.
Therefore, it suffices to prove that for all r,
∑r
i=1 bi ≤∑r
i=1 a˜i.
(i) If r < t or r ≥ s, then∑ri=1 a˜i =∑ri=1 ai ≥∑ri=1 bi,
by (28).
9(ii) If t ≤ r < s, then
r∑
i=1
a˜i =
t−1∑
i=1
ai +
r∑
i=t
a˜i
=
t−1∑
i=1
bi +
r∑
i=t
a˜i ≥
t−1∑
i=1
bi + (r − t+ 1)(at − 1),
(29)
where the first and second equalities are true because
the first t − 1 elements of a, a˜ and b are the same, and
last inequality follows from the fact that for t ≤ j < s,
a˜i ≥ (at − 1). Moreover,
r∑
i=1
bi =
t−1∑
i=1
bi +
r∑
i=t
bi
≤
t−1∑
i=1
bi + (r − t+ 1)bt ≤
t−1∑
i=1
bi + (r − t+ 1)(at − 1),
(30)
where the last inequality follows from bt < at. Equations
(29) and (30) imply that ∑ri=1 bi ≤∑ri=1 a˜i, and hence
a˜ ≺ b.
Claim 1. Let a ≺ b 3 with a 6= b. Then, there exists a finite
sequence of 1 unit RH transfers that can be applied on a to
get b.
Proof: The claim is established using Lemmas 5 and 6.
Let a0 = a.
(i) For n = 1, 2, . . ., if an−1 6= b, use Lemma 6 to
construct an 6= an−1 such that an−1 ≺ an ≺ b. Then,
an 6= am for any m < n− 1 (otherwise, we would have
am = an ≺ an−1 ≺ an =⇒ an = an−1).
(ii) If an−1 = b, stop.
Since there are only finitely many non-negative integer valued
vectors that majorize b, this procedure must stop after finite
number of steps and it can do so only if an−1 = b. This
proves the claim.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
If ut =
∑m
j=1 ν
j
t , t = 1, . . . , T , where∑
t
νjt = k
i + 1, νjt ∈ {0, 1} for j = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ,∑
t
νjt = k
i, νjt ∈ {0, 1} for j = ℓ+ 1, . . . ,m, (31)
then clearly ut ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} and
∑T
t=1 ut = km+ ℓ = E.
To prove the converse, first assume ℓ > 0. Consider an allo-
cation ut ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} satisfying
∑T
t=1 ut = km+ ℓ = E.
Then, ut > 0 for at least k + 1 time slots and ut = m for
3Recall that the vectors are arranged in non-increasing order.
at most k time slots. Pick k + 1 time slots with largest value
of ut. Define ν1t = 1 at the selected slots and 0 otherwise.
Let Bt = ut − ν1t . Then, Bt ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1} and∑
tBt = k(m − 1) + (ℓ − 1). If ℓ = 0, then ut > 0 for
at least k time slots and ut = m for at most k time slots.
Pick k time slots with largest value of ut. Define ν1t = 1 at
the selected slots and 0 otherwise. Let Bt = ut − ν1t . Then,
Bt ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m−1} and
∑
tBt = k(m−1). Thus, we can
always write ut as
ut = ν
1
t +Bt, (32)
where ν1t ∈ {0, 1},
∑
t ν
1
t = k+1{ℓ>0}, Bt ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m−
1} and ∑
t
Bt = k(m− 1) + (ℓ− 1)
+.
Now, if (ℓ− 1) > 0, then Bt > 0 for at least k + 1 slots and
Bt = m − 1 for at most k slots. Pick k + 1 time slots with
largest value of Bt. Define ν2t = 1 at the selected slots and 0
otherwise. Let Ct = Bt − ν2t . Then, Ct ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 2}
and
∑
t Ct = k(m−2)+(ℓ−2). If (ℓ−1)+ = 0, then Bt > 0
for at least k time slots and Bt = m for at most k time slots.
Pick k time slots with largest value of Bt. Define ν2t = 1 at
the selected slots and 0 otherwise. Let Ct = Bt − ν2t . Then,
Ct ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 2} and
∑
t Ct = k(m− 2). Thus, we can
write ut as
ut = ν
1
t + ν
2
t + Ct, (33)
where ν2t ∈ {0, 1},
∑
t ν
2
t = k + 1{ℓ>1},Ct ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m−
2} and ∑
t
Ct = k(m− 2) + (ℓ− 2)
+.
Continuing sequentially, we can decompose ut into
ν1t , . . . , ν
m
t .
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Recall that
D(C) = {(Ej , 1)|j = 1, 2, . . . , N},
dt :=
N∑
j=1
1{Ej≥t}.
We require with the following intermediate result.
Lemma 7. For a given collection of services D(C), if a is an
exactly adequate supply, then any supply b satisfying a ≺ b
is also exactly adequate.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we will assume that
a and b are arranged in non-increasing order. Since b can
be obtained from a by a sequence of 1 unit RH transfers
(see Claim 1, Appendix A), we simply need to prove that
a 1 unit RH transfer preserves exact adequacy. Consider an
exactly adequate supply vector a and let νjt , j = 1, . . . , N, t =
1, . . . , T be the corresponding allocations. Consider a 1 unit
RH transfer from time t to s (without rearrangement) that gives
a new supply vector a˜. Let i be a service for which νit = 1
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but νis = 0. Such an i must exist because
∑
j ν
j
t = at > as =∑
j ν
j
s . Under the new supply, the allocations
˜
νjr =


νjr r 6= t, s or j 6= i
0 r = t, j = i
1 r = s, j = i
(34)
establish exact adequacy.
Proof of Theorem 1 (a): Observe that a supply vector p =
d is exactly adequate: the allocation function νjt = 1{Ej≥t}
meets the exact adequacy requirements. Therefore, by Lemma
7, any p satisfying p ≻ d is also exactly adequate.
To prove necessity, suppose p is exactly adequate and νjt ,
j = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T are the corresponding allocations.
Consider any set S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , T } of cardinality s. Then,
because νjt ∈ {0, 1} and
∑T
t=1 ν
j
t = E
j
, it follows that
∑
t∈S
νjt ≤ min(s, E
j) =
s∑
t=1
1{t≤Ej}. (35)
Summing over j,
N∑
j=1
∑
t∈S
νjt ≤
N∑
j=1
s∑
t=1
1{t≤Ej}
=⇒
∑
t∈S
N∑
j=1
νjt ≤
s∑
t=1
N∑
j=1
1{t≤Ej}
=⇒
∑
t∈S
pt ≤
s∑
t=1
dt for all S with |S| = s
=⇒
s∑
t=1
p↓t ≤
s∑
t=1
dt (36)
For s = T , the inequality in (35) becomes an equality resulting
in an equality in (36).
Proof of Theorem 1 (b): To prove necessity, suppose p
is adequate and νjt , j = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T are the
corresponding allocations. Then, for any set S ⊂ {1, . . . , T }
of cardinality s ∑
t∈S
pt ≥
∑
t∈S
N∑
j=1
νjt (37)
Further, because νjt ∈ {0, 1} and
∑T
t=1 ν
j
t = E
j
, it follows
that
∑
t∈S
νjt ≥ max(E
j − s+ 1, 0) =
T∑
t=s
1{t≤Ej}
Summing over j,
N∑
j=1
∑
t∈S
νjt ≥
N∑
j=1
T∑
t=s
1{t≤Ej}
=⇒
∑
t∈S
N∑
j=1
νjt ≥
T∑
t=s
N∑
j=1
1{t≤Ej}
=⇒
∑
t∈S
N∑
j=1
νjt ≥
T∑
t=s
dt. (38)
Combining (37) and (38) proves the necessity conditions.
To prove sufficiency, let ∆ =
∑T
t=1 pt −
∑T
t=1 dt. Then,
∆ ≥ 0. Consider a new demand duration vector d∆ defined
as d∆t := dt + ∆1{t≤1}. This new demand duration vector
corresponds to the original set of unit rate services augmented
with ∆ “fictitious unit rate services” with Ej = 1. It is easy
to see that p ≻w d implies p ≻ d∆. Therefore, by part (a)
of Theorem 1, p is exactly adequate for the augmented set of
services which implies that it must be adequate for the original
set of services D(C).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Since p is adequate, there must exist at least one set of
allocations bjt , j = 1 . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T
T∑
t=1
bjt = E
j ,
N∑
j=1
bjt ≤ pt.
Let B1 be the subset of services in D(C) that are served at
time 1, that is, for which bj1 = 1. Similarly, let V1 be the
subset of services in D(C) for which νj1 defined in (8) is 1. It
is easy to check that |B1| ≤ |V1|.
If V1 6= B1, but the two sets have the same cardinality, pick
a service i ∈ V1 \ B1 and j ∈ B1 \ V1. Then, π(i) < π(j)
which implies that Ei ≥ Ej . Therefore, there must exist a
time s > 1 such that bis = 1 but bjs = 0. Consider a new
set of allocations obtained by swapping the load i at time
s and the load j at time 1, that is, the new allocation rule
bkt (1), k = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T is identical to bkt except
that for t = 1, s
bit(1) = b
j
t and b
j
t (1) = b
i
t.
It is straightforward to establish that the new allocation rule
satisfies the adequacy requirements. One can proceed with
this swapping argument one service at a time until the set
of services being served at time 1 is equal to V1.
In the case where |B1| < |V1|, pick i ∈ V1 \ B1. There must
be a time s > 1 such that bis = 1. Consider a new allocation
that is identical to bkt except that bi1 = 1 and bis = 0. The new
set of services served at time 1 is now B∪{i}. Keep repeating
this argument, until |V1| number of services are being served
at time 1. Then, use the swapping argument from above to
transform the set of services being served at time 1 to V1.
For time t > 1, the same swapping argument works by
replacing Ej with the energy needed by service j from time
t to the final time, which is Ej −
∑t−1
s=1 ν
j
s .
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Let S be any non-empty subset of {1, 2, . . . , T } and let |S|
denote the cardinality of S.
T∑
t=1
(qt − pt) ≥
∑
t∈S
(qt − pt)
≥
T∑
s=T−|S|+1
ds −
∑
t∈S
pt, (39)
where we used the fact that d ≺w q in (39). Since (39) holds
for any S, it follows that
T∑
t=1
(qt − pt) ≥ max
S⊂{1,...,T}

 T∑
s=T−|S|+1
ds −
∑
t∈S
pt


= max
1≤r≤T

 max
S⊂{1,...,T},|S|=T−r+1

 T∑
s=T−|S|+1
ds −
∑
t∈S
pt




= max
1≤r≤T
[
T∑
s=r
ds − min
S⊂{1,...,T},|S|=T−r+1
∑
t∈S
pt
]
= max
1≤r≤T
[
T∑
s=r
ds −
T∑
s=r
p↓s
]
. (40)
(40) and the fact that ∑Tt=1(qt − pt) ≥ 0 proves the lemma.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Recall that qt = yt + rt + g∗t (C,y, r1, . . . , rt), where g∗(·) is
defined as the solution of the minimization problem in (16).
Proof of Part 1. From the definition of a1, we have q1 ≥ dT
which implies the following majorization relation between the
one-dimensional vectors q1 and dT : q1 ≻w dT .
We now proceed by a induction argument. Assume that the
t − 1 dimensional majorization relation (q1, . . . , qt−1) ≻w
(dT−t+2, . . . , dT ) is true. Then, the optimization problem of
(16) at time t is equivalent to the following linear program
min
at≥0
at
subject to
yt + rt + at ≥ dT
qs + yt + rt + at ≥ dT + dT−1, for all s < t∑
s=s1,s2,...,sk
qs + (yt + rt + at) ≥ dT−k + · · ·+ dT ,
for all s1 < · · · < sk < t and k ≤ t− 1
It is straightforward to see that the above linear program has a
non-negative integer solution. (Recall that all variables in the
linear program are non-negative integers.) The resulting t−
dimensional vector (q1, . . . , qt) (where qt = yt+rt+at) satis-
fies the t− dimensional majorization relation (q1, . . . , qt) ≻w
(dT−t+1, . . . , dT ). The induction argument is now complete
and we conclude the T− dimensional majorization relation
q ≻w d is true.
Proof of Part 2. This is an immediate consequence of
Theorem 2 and Lemma 2.
Proof of Part 3. We first define T + 1 vectors
p(0),p(1), . . . ,p(T ) as follows:
p(0) := y + r,
p(1) := y + r+ (a1, 0, . . . , 0)
p(t) := y + r+ (a1, a2, . . . , at, 0 . . . 0) for 1 < t < T ,
p(T ) = y + r+ (a1, . . . , aT ) = q, (41)
where a1, a2, . . . , aT are the real-time purchases under the
policy g∗ obtained by the solving the minimization in (16).
We also define the following functions:
1) For any vector x = (x1, . . . , xT ),
F (x) :=

 max
S⊂{1,2,...,T}

 T∑
s=T−|S|+1
ds −
∑
r∈S
xr




+
.
2) S(x) be any subset of {1, 2, . . . , T } that achieves the
maximum in the definition of F (x).
We will use the following result.
Claim 2. 1. F (p(T )) = 0 and
F (p(0)) = L(C,y, r) =
[
max
1≤r≤T
T∑
s=r
(ds − p
↓
s)
]+
,
where p = y + r.
2. For t = 2, . . . , T ,
F (p(t)) = F (p(t− 1))− at. (42)
Suppose Claim 2 is true. Then, combining (42) for all t gives
F (p(T )) = F (p)−
T∑
t=1
at
=⇒
T∑
t=1
at = F (p)− F (p(T )) = L(C,y, r), (43)
and this proves part 3 of the theorem.
We now prove Claim 2. By part 1 of Theorem 3, p(T ) =
q ≻w d. Therefore, for any set S,
T∑
s=T−|S|+1
ds ≤
∑
r∈S
qr.
This implies that F (p(T )) = 0.
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For p(0),
F (p(0)) =

 max
S⊂{1,2,...,T}

 T∑
s=T−|S|+1
ds −
∑
t∈S
pt(0)




+
=

 max
1≤r≤T
max
S⊂{1,...,T},
|S|=T−r+1

 T∑
s=T−|S|+1
ds −
∑
t∈S
pt(0)




+
=

 max
1≤r≤T
T∑
s=r
ds − min
S⊂{1,...,T},
|S|=T−r+1
∑
t∈S
pt(0)


+
=
[
max
1≤r≤T
T∑
s=r
ds −
T∑
s=r
p↓s(0)
]+
= L(C,y, r).
This proves the first part of the claim.
For the second part, if at = 0, then p(t) = p(t − 1) and
therefore (42) trivially holds. We consider the case where at >
0. Recall from the proof of Part 1 of Theorem 3 that at is the
solution of the linear program
min
at≥0
at
subject to
yt + rt + at ≥ dT
qs + yt + rt + at ≥ dT + dT−1, for all s < t∑
s=s1,s2,...,sk
qs + (yt + rt + at) ≥ dT−k + · · ·+ dT ,
for all s1 < · · · < sk < t and k ≤ t− 1
(Also recall that for s < t, qs = ys + rs + as = ps(t − 1).)
The constraints in the above program can be written as:
T∑
s=T−|T |+1
ds −
∑
s∈T
ps(t− 1)− at ≤ 0,
for all T ⊂ {1, . . . , t} that contain t.
Let T be the collection of all non-empty subsets of
{1, 2, . . . , t}. For any T ∈ T that does not contain t (that
is, T ⊂ {1, . . . , t − 1}), the real-time purchase decisions
a1, a2, . . . , at−1 chosen according to (16) ensure that
T∑
s=T−|T |+1
ds −
∑
s∈T
ps(t− 1) ≤ 0.
However, at > 0 implies that there must be some set T ⊂
{1, . . . , t} with t ∈ T for which
T∑
s=T−|T |+1
ds −
∑
s∈T
ps(t− 1) > 0. (44)
If no such T existed, then at should have been 0. Consider
the following maximization
max
T ∈T
T∑
s=T−|T |+1
ds −
∑
s∈T
ps(t− 1). (45)
and let T ∗ be a maximizing set. From (44), it follows that the
maximum value in (45) is positive and that t ∈ T ∗.
We now proceed as follows:
Fact 1: F (p(t−1)) is maximized by some S(p(t−1)) ⊃ T ∗.
To prove this fact, consider any S and write it as (S ∩ T ∗) ∪
S \ T ∗. Then,
T∑
s=T−|S|+1
ds −
∑
s∈S
ps(t− 1)
=

 T∑
s=T−|S∩T ∗|+1
ds −
∑
s∈S∩T ∗
ps(t− 1)


+

 T−|S∩T ∗|∑
s=T−|S|+1
ds −
∑
s∈S\T ∗
ps(t− 1)

 . (46)
Now consider a S ′ := T ∗ ∪ S \ T ∗. For this set,
T∑
s=T−|S′|+1
ds −
∑
s∈S′
ps(t− 1)
=

 T∑
s=T−|T ∗|+1
ds −
∑
s∈T ∗
ps(t− 1)


+

 T−|T ∗|∑
s=T−|S′|+1
ds −
∑
s∈S\T ∗
ps(t− 1)

 . (47)
Compare each of the two bracketed terms in (46) with the
corresponding term in (47). The first term in (46) is no greater
than the corresponding term in (47) because T ∗ achieves the
maximum in (45). The second term in (46) is no greater than
the corresponding term in (47) because d is non-increasing
in its index (dt ≥ dt+1). Thus, F (p(t− 1)) is maximized by
some S(p(t − 1)) ⊃ T ∗.
Fact 2: F (p(t)) is maximized by some S(p(t)) ⊃ T ∗. Note
that the p(t − 1) and p(t) are the same except for the tth
element. The real-time purchase at time t, at the smallest value
added to p(t− 1) that ensures that
(dT−t+1, . . . , dT ) ≺
w (p1(t), p2(t), . . . , pt(t)).
Therefore, for any T ⊂ {1, . . . , t},
T∑
s=T−|T |+1
ds −
∑
s∈T
ps(t) ≤ 0,
with equality for T = T ∗. We can now repeat the arguments
used in proving Fact 1 to establish Fact 2.
Fact 3: Both F (p(t− 1)) and F (p(t))) are maximized by
a set U = T ∗ ∪ V∗, where T ∗ ∩ V∗ = ∅.
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Because of Fact 1, F (p(t− 1)) can be written as

 T∑
s=T−|T ∗|+1
ds −
∑
s∈T ∗
ps(t− 1)

+
max
V⊂{1,...,T}\T ∗

 T−|T ∗|∑
s=T−|V|−|T ∗|+1
ds −
∑
s∈V
ps(t− 1)

 (48)
Similarly, for F (p(t)),

 T∑
s=T−|T ∗|+1
ds −
∑
s∈T ∗
ps(t)

+
max
V⊂{1,...,T}\T ∗

 T−|T ∗|∑
s=T−|V|−|T ∗|+1
ds −
∑
s∈V
ps(t)

 (49)
Recall that p(t − 1) and p(t) differ only in the tth element
and that t ∈ T ∗. Therefore, the maximizations in (48) and
(49) are the same. This establishes Fact 3.
Because of Fact 3,
F (p(t)) =

 T∑
s=T−|T ∗|+1
ds −
∑
s∈T ∗
ps(t)


+

 T−|T ∗|∑
s=T−|V∗|−|T ∗|+1
ds −
∑
s∈V∗
ps(t)


=

 T∑
s=T−|T ∗|+1
ds −
∑
s∈T ∗
ps(t− 1)

− at
+

 T−|T ∗|∑
s=T−|V∗|−|T ∗|+1
ds −
∑
s∈V∗
ps(t− 1)


= F (p(t− 1))− at. (50)
This proves the second part of Claim 2.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Part 1. In order to prove the convexity of the objective
function in (22) , it suffices to prove the convexity of
max
1≤t≤T
(
T∑
s=t
(ds − (r+ y)
↓
s)
)+
for each possible realization r of the renewable supply. Since
maximum of convex functions is convex, it is sufficient to
prove that (
T∑
s=t
(ds − (r+ y)
↓
s)
)+
(51)
is convex for all t. (51) can be written as
=
T∑
s=t
ds − min
S⊂{1,2,...,T},
|S|=T−t+1
(∑
k∈S
(rk + yk)
)
=
T∑
s=t
ds + max
S⊂{1,2,...,T},
|S|=T−t+1
(
−
∑
k∈S
(rk + yk)
)
= max
S⊂{1,2,...,T},
|S|=T−t+1
(
T∑
s=t
ds −
∑
k∈S
(rk + yk)
)
(52)
Since (52) is a maximum of affine functions of d,y, it implies
that it is convex in d,y. This completes the proof pf Part 1.
Part 2. The construction of integer solutions in (24) implies
that
T∑
t=1
π(t, 1)(dat − d
a
t+1) ≥
T∑
t=1
π(t, 1)(dct − d
c
t+1 − 1)
=
T∑
t=1
π(t, 1)(dct − d
c
t+1)−
T∑
t=1
π(t, 1), (53)
and
cda
T∑
t=1
yat ≤ c
da
T∑
t=1
(yct + 1) = c
da
T∑
t=1
yct + c
daT (54)
Thus, the decrease in revenue in changing (dc,yc) to (da,ya)
is less than
∑T
t=1 π(t, 1) while the increase in day-ahead
energy cost is less than cdaT .
Because, da ≤ dc and ya ≥ yc, it follows that for each
realization r of R,[
max
1≤t≤T
T∑
s=t
(das − (y
a + r)↓s)
]+
≤
[
max
1≤t≤T
T∑
s=t
(dcs − (y
c + r)↓s)
]+
. (55)
Combining (53),(54) and (55), it follows that
J(dc,yc)− J(da,ya) ≤ cdaT +
T∑
t=1
π(t, 1).
Finally, observing that
J(d∗,y∗)− J(da,ya) ≤ J(dc,yc)− J(da,ya),
proves (25).
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